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Abstract: Online privacy has become immensely important with the growth of technology and
the expansion of communication. Social Media Networks have risen to the forefront of current
communication trends. With the current trends in social media, the question now becomes how can
we actively protect ourselves on these platforms? Users of social media networks share billions of images
a day. Whether intentional or unintentional, users tend to share private information within these
images. In this study, we investigate (1) the users’ perspective of privacy, (2) pervasiveness of privacy
leaks on Twitter, and (3) the threats and dangers on these platforms. In this study, we incorporate
techniques such as text analysis, analysis of variance, and crowdsourcing to process the data received
from these sources. Based on the results, the participants’ definitions of privacy showed overlap
regardless of age or gender identity. After looking at the survey results, most female participants
displayed a heightened fear of dangers on social media networks because of threats in the following
areas: assets and identity. When the participants were asked to rank the threats on social media, they
showed a high concern for burglary and kidnapping. We find that participants need more education
about the threats of visual content and how these privacy leaks can lead to physical, mental, and
emotional danger.
Keywords: privacy; social media networks; emerging technology; social impact of technology
1. Introduction: Social Media Networks, Privacy, and Technology
Increase in technology use has expanded the fronts that privacy advocates must fight. Privacy
concerns for credit breaches (e.g., Equifax in 2017), government breaches (e.g., Office of Personnel
Management breach in 2015), and personal conversations require personnel to exercise control of
the information disseminated; otherwise, the fundamental concept of privacy is violated. Ensuring
that your privacy is secure online and safe from outsiders is key to protecting yourself, your family,
and your assets. As technology and communication expands, new facets of breaches arise. These
developments promote breeding grounds for privacy leakage due to the changes in social culture,
development of technology features, and changes in the targeted audience.
Ninety percent of Facebook profiles contain at least one image, 87.8% of users share their birth
date, phone numbers are listed on 39.9% of the profiles (including 28.8% that contain cell phone
numbers), and 50.8% of users share current residency [1]. Additionally, revealing information such
as birthdate, hometown, current residence, and phone number can be used to estimate the user’s
social security number and exposes them to potential financial and identity threats [1]. This type of
information can be found in posts that contain visual content.
Images that contain privacy leaks may expose intimate information that is harmful to your
finances, personal life, and reputation [1]. Visual privacy leaks include any instance in which a transfer
of a personal identifying image is shared. Leaks that involve images are especially pernicious because
they are so unexpected. For example, private images can include baby faces, credit cards, phone
numbers, social security cards, house keys and other personal identifiable information [2]. Anything
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posted to these Social Media Networks (SMNs) can be exposed to someone even after removal of
the content [3]. Users re-use the same content across SMNs, this duplicated content can be used to
find profiles across platforms [1]. On SMNs, the users’ information and visual content can intentionally
or unintentionally be shared even though there may be a privacy risk contained [1]. From visual content,
attackers can extract textual information, including credit card numbers, social security numbers, place
of residence, phone numbers and other information [1,4]. This content can consequently create an
opportunity for “cyberbullying” of other users [3].
Through this investigation, we explore the state of privacy on social media networks with an
emphasis on visual privacy leaks and the future of privacy for its’ users. This study creates a foundation
to understand the users’ concerns about the possibility of having secrets in the future and the threats
that emerging technologies will expose them to. In summary, the purpose of our work is to understand:
• The privacy perspective of a user can be subjective (Section 3). With this investigation, we were
able to uncover the subjectivity of users through age and gender demographics. This section also
demonstrates the differences privacy and visual privacy.
• Visual content privacy leaks are common among users on Twitter (Section 4.1). In this study, we
found severe and moderate privacy leaks on Twitter. In comparison to the data set, these numbers
were low. We believe that with relevant and trending search terms we will be able to improve
future results.
• Several threats and dangers are heightened due to the accessibility of social media (Section 3.4).
This work provided an understanding of the most threatening dangers to users as well as a
hierarchy of dangers in correlation to the rankings of the participants.
2. Previous Literature
Previous work studying user privacy on SMNs have focused on multiparty privacy conflicts [5,6],
images or text content from users [1,7–14], third-party applications that supervise privacy [11,13–15],
cultures in university settings/communities [1], the users’ SMNs privacy settings [1,3,16,17], studies on
users’ attitudes, intention, or behaviors [7,17], and children/teenagers’ interactions with SMNs [18,19].
Online privacy is important to the growth of technology and the expansion of communication.
Since social media has become a popular social forum, our private lives will continually be lived out
in a public domain. To many, privacy on social media networks is user-dependent. People tend to
share different content, have different privacy settings, and different perspectives of privacy. There
are several papers that examine privacy settings of users’ accounts in correlation to their privacy
leakage [1,16,17]; moreover, there are privacy concerns that go beyond privacy settings [1]. Through
the exploration of users’ attitudes and intentions on social media platforms, upcoming developments
consider the fact that privacy settings of social networks are failing the users [17]. To help the user
customize their privacy settings, authors [20] suggests six privacy profiles: privacy maximizers,
selective shares, privacy balancers, time savers, self-censors, and privacy minimalists. Investigating
privacy settings of users on social media is important, but it is also important to explore the disclosed
information from users [1,21]. The intersection of privacy settings and third-party applications on
these platforms create opportunity for more risks [16]. Social networks need to take meaningful
action to decrease the exposure of personal information. The risks of engaging on social media could
outweigh the benefits. The exploration of these risks was investigated by [3]. Studies have provided
third-party applications that will help reduce the amount of visual privacy leaks until social media
platforms employ further action [11,15,22,23].
The perception of privacy is highly subjective and user-dependent [10], which is shown by
literature focusing on users’ attitudes towards privacy [17]. As people engage on social media, the
images posted can contain potential privacy leaks for users [10]. In several studies it has been found
that images on social media can pose danger [1,3,5,8]. With visual content on social media someone
can uncover personal identifying information that can be collected from them [8]. Visual content
can also become a gateway for multiparty conflicts among users [5]. These conflicts can arise due to
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feelings of ownership, privacy boundaries, and privacy perspectives of the individuals in the content.
Looking further into self-censoring and reduction of multiparty conflict, users can implement privacy
preserving procedures to reduce identity, association, and content disclosure [24].
Researchers have developed mitigation techniques for visual privacy that range between
intervention methods and data hiding [25]. To protect visual privacy, these methods can be implemented
before posting the content or after identifying private objects. Most privacy technology uses one or
more of these five protection techniques: intervention [23,26], blind vision [2,4,12], secure processing
[12,15], redaction [27–30], and data hiding [12,15,31].
Beyond protecting ourselves from dangers, there are also minors at risk. Studies exploring
teenager attitudes towards privacy note that teenagers tend to be more open about their lives on social
media when compared to older users [18,19] . On social media, teenagers and children are exposed
to potential dangers like stalking and sexual predators because of this openness. Studies emphasize
the importance of stranger danger and insider threat for minors on SMNs because the real threat lies
within the users’ friends because of interpersonal sharing [32]. The collection of personal information
through social engineering and other techniques could affect national security and government officials
on these platforms [7]. With the use of surveys, researchers [7,9,17] can understand what information
they share and gauge their understanding of privacy in respect to their ethnicity.
From this literature, we can begin to uncover the importance of privacy and the growing need
for evolving technologies to combat online threats. Previous works have discussed concerns with
visual content focusing on multiparty conflicts, third-party applications, privacy settings, and the
danger of this content. The current state of this field shows the importance to continue investigation
and development of visual privacy and mitigation techniques to protect SMNs users. The future of
this field is in the development of mitigation techniques, understanding the pervasiveness of visual
privacy leaks, and helping users understand the correlation of privacy to threats and dangers on these
networks. Our research investigates based on the foundation of these works. With this foundation, we
explore the future of privacy on SMNs through participant surveys, data collection from Twitter, and
analysis of these results. This work details the attitudes and perspectives toward visual privacy, and
the data collection results from Twitter.
3. Attitudes and Perspectives towards Visual Private Information
The user’s perspective of freedoms, beliefs, ownership, and vulnerabilities aid to guide their
decision-making process when engaging on social media. On these platforms, users determine what
information to share based on their perceived freedoms and feelings of security. Each user’s perspective
of privacy will vary based on their subjectivity.
3.1. Survey Overview
We deployed two surveys that asked participants about their knowledge, experiences, and
perspectives of social media networks. This encompassed social engagement behaviors and visual
privacy leaks. Many of these survey questions were derived from our study, but had influence from
others [7,9,17]. The 250 participants completed the surveys online and were not required to answer
every question. The first survey (IRB #10299) is used to gauge participants engagement across various
platforms. The second survey (IRB #11349) focused on participants use of Twitter and their engagement
with visual privacy.
From the surveys, we look at the participants use of social media networks, definitions of privacy,
and observations of privacy leaks on social media networks. To avoid bias, the questions were
randomized and the survey concluded with demographic questions [33,34]. Table 1 recaps the
questions that were asked of the participants in the first survey. Each response that included text
entry from the user was analyzed using text analysis methods. The responses were segmented into
categories: age and gender identity; then analyzed using Elbow–Knee plots, clustering, and feature
weights.
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On average, participants engage on SMNs for 11–20 h per week (Table 1B). Majority of the
participants have multiple SMN profiles from different platforms (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Reddit).
In this survey, that the leading platforms are YouTube (98 participants), Instagram (80 participants),
and Snapchat (65 participants) which are all image and video-based platforms (Table 1A). From this
survey, the content posted the most across SMNs is via images and videos. Forty-seven percent of
participants post images and 11% of participants post videos; only 42% of participants post textual
content (Table 1C). With images alone or the combination of video content, visual content is becoming
the prominent method of posting content on SMNs. These responses support literature stating that
with the growth of technology and SMNs, the percentages of content posted as images and videos will
continually increase.
Table 1. This table displays the outline of the IRB #10299 survey that was completed by participants.
The survey was compromised of multiple-choice questions and short answer.
Item Question
A Of what Social Media Networks (SMNs) do you consider yourself a frequent user?
B How many hours per week do you spend on social media networks?
C What type of content do you usually post on social media?
D Do you post any of these types of images or videos on your SMNs?
E How would you define privacy? (in one sentence)
F Would you define privacy the same for social media networks?
G Personally identifying information is information that can be used to uniquely identify, contact,
or locate a person. Agree or Disagree?
H Privacy leaks include any instance in which a transfer of personal identifying visual content is
shared on Social Media Networks. Private visual content exposes intimate information that
can be detrimental to your finances, personal life, and reputation. Agree or Disagree?
I Would you consider any of these images to have identifying information?
J As a typical user of Social Media Networks (SMNs), if you were to post these items would you
consider these items to be private?
K Drag and drop the following dangers in order of most threatening (most threatening ranked 1
and so on).
L Do you believe there are other dangers on Social Media Networks? If so, list them.
M What type of threat would these items fall under?
N Do you believe that conflict (e.g., bullying, domestic disputes) can increase the occurrence of
privacy leaks?
3.2. Pre-Processing Raw Survey Responses
Once the data collection process was complete, we began pre-processing the raw data using
text analysis [35], natural language processing [36], and regular expressions [37]. We conducted this
processing in four steps.
Word Tokenization. This method splits each text entry provided by the participants into sentences
and then several tokens. Most of the tokens were split on the whitespace in between tokens.
Lemmatization. This task replaces words that have prefixes and suffixes with their root word.
Lemmatization allows us to treat the list of tokens that are used slightly differently as the same
word. We use the WordNet dictionary for lemmatization [38].
Combining similar words. Some words are completely different with the same meaning, in these
cases we created a list to make explicit substitutions (i.e., birthdate, birthday, bday).
Stopword removal. We removed stopwords and articles using a standard English language list.
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With these methods employed, it would reduce the error of the inverse document frequency and
the term frequency for word analysis and document clustering.
3.3. Surveyed Definitions of Privacy
To begin the analysis of these survey results, we analyzed the common themes from their
definitions of privacy. Among the 250 participants that completed the survey, 154 participants
responded to Question E in Table 1. To obtain the most meaningful terms through the set of answers, we
compute the TF-IDF scores for each term and then take the average score across all documents where
the terms appear. That is, for a term t that appears in an answer d among the set of all answers D. The




The document frequency is the number of times a term t appears across all answers (d ∈ D). The
document frequency is given by, df(t, D) = ∑d∈D 1(t ∈ D). The inverse document frequency is a
factor that down weights terms that appear too often across all documents. These words are viewed as
less important. The idf formula is given by idf(t, d) = 1 + log 1+ndf(t,D) . The average importance of each
term in the data set is calculated by the product of the inverse document frequency and average term
frequency for each document the term appears as shown in Equation 1.
avg(TF-IDF)(t, D) = idf(t, D) ∗ avgt∈d(tf(t, d)). (1)
In their responses, the words information, personal, private, and share are the most relevant words
used to detail how they envision privacy on social media and in the real world (Table 2). Majority
of the participants were adamant that their definition of privacy would not change regarding their
physical life or digital one. However, a small subset of participants stated that their definitions of
privacy would not be the same. This definition change could be attributed to the participants feelings
about the levels of privacy, the unknown factors that exist on a digital network, or fears of exploitation
by companies or scammers on these platforms.
Table 2. The weight for each term is computed by averaging the Term Frequency and the Inverse






3.3.1. Privacy Definitions by Cluster
The definitions given where further clustered into two groups using Kmeans and yellowbrick
clustering via KElbowVisualizer [39]. We deployed Kmeans clustering model and found the elbow
of the data using the yellowbrick clustering package. For evaluation we use the Calinski Harabasz
method to find the optimal cluster size [40]. This method computes the ratio of distribution between
clusters and the distribution of points within the clusters. The other scoring metrics provided by
yellowbricks include distortion and silhouette. We chose the Calinski Harabasz method because it gave
us the desired separation focusing on intracluster similarity and intercluster differences—rewarding
the best clustering based on the total size and number of clusters. This method uses Equation 2.
SSB
SSW
∗ N − k
k− 1 (2)
In this equation, SSB is the overall intercluster distance, SSW is the overall intracluster distances,
N is the total number of data points, and k is the number of clusters. Using this scoring method, we
ran the KElbowVisualizer to find cluster values ranging from 2 to 16. In this process we noticed that
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the elbow returned at various points for multiple runs. To alleviate this issue, we ran the model 100
times and picked the best mean scores. Based on lowest error and consistency of performance, the best
breakeven point was at k = 6 (Figure 1a). The intercluster distance shows how strong the correlation is
between the clusters and keywords. From Figure 1b, we notice that Cluster 1 is completely different
from the remaining 5 clusters. However, cluster 0 and clusters 2–5 have a strong overlap of keywords.
(a) (b)
Figure 1. Diagrams of the Elbow–Knee scores and errors using Calinski Harabasz method. (a) Diagram
of the Error Ribbon for the Elbow–Knee Plots using Calinski Harabasz method with cluster size (k)
ranging from 2 to 16. (b) Diagram of Intercluster Distance Map using YellowBricks Calinski Harabasz
method with cluster size (k) = 6.
In those clusters, we see the zeroth cluster included 36 definitions and the words: information,
share, and want (Table 3). In Cluster 0, the privacy revolves around authorization, freedoms, and
rights of the users on these social media platforms. Cluster 1 included 33 definitions and included the
words: social, address, and security. In this cluster, we derived the theme to be protection of personal
information regarding physical boundaries, digital security, and personal identifying information.
Cluster 2 included 27 definitions and included the words: know, want, and people. In Cluster 2, we
hypothesize the definition of privacy emphasized their ability to share information at discretion of the
owner without being tied back to that information. Cluster 3 included 30 definitions and included the
words: right, ability, and control. The definition for Cluster 3 focuses on accessibility and knowledge
of others. The participants in this cluster want to protect themselves their information being shared
in a public domain and keep the information disseminated about them in a controlled environment.
Cluster 4 included 16 definitions and included the words: passwords, control, and information. The
participants clustered in group four defined privacy by access and use of information. It is the user’s
right to control access of data to keep their information safe. Cluster 5 included 13 definitions and
included the words: personal, private, and identify. The last group of participants focus on individual
subjectivity about privacy with a focus on personally identifiable information (e.g., social security
number, address). Table 3 provides a synopsis of the cluster key words and scores to show their level
of importance to each respective cluster.
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Table 3. Cluster breakdown of the top terms used to define privacy using average TF-IDF scores.































3.3.2. Privacy Definitions by Gender Identity
These definitions were further broken down into gender identities. In the section of female
participants, the most important words are information, personal, private, share, and social. Of the
male participants, the most important words are information, personal, want, control, and private.
The remaining participants found the most important words to be birthdate, blood, date, location, and
security. It is further noted that the female participants are more concerned with personally identifying
information regarding harm and hacking, while the male participants are concerned with financial
attacks and exposed information.
In Table 4, the top five keywords are identified for each gender identity. Collectively from every
group the keywords are: information, personal, private, share, social, want, control, birthdate, blood,
date, location, and security. For further investigation, we began to look at the statistical analysis to find
the significance of the words for each gender identity subgroup. In this process we used the analysis
of variance (ANOVA) method to analyze the differences between the groups from our participants.
Table 5 explore the statistical values produced from this analysis.
To understand the significance of each category, we look at the null hypotheses and p-values
associated with the independent and dependent variables. Our null hypothesis states that there are no
significant differences in gender identities and the associated keywords. Our p-value threshold is set at
0.05. In the gender comparisons of Female vs. Male, Female vs. Other, and Male vs. Other; we reject
the null hypothesis because differences exist in the keywords for gender identities.
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Table 4. Top five terms used to define privacy using average TF-IDF scores for each by gender
demographic.



















Table 5. Calculated ANOVA score for top words used among gender identities to define visual privacy.
Gender Identity Comparison f -Value p-Value
Female vs. Male 5.9749 0.0061
Female vs. Other 6.0464 0.0222
Male vs. Other 6.4194 0.0189
3.3.3. Privacy Definitions by Age Group
These definitions were further clustered into two age groups. In the section of participants
ranging between 18–25, the most important words are information, personal, right, control, and
private. The definitions of this group revolve around preservation information from hackers and
government surveillance. Of the participants over the age of 26, we see the most important words are
information, personal, anything, private, and share. The second group’s definitions seem to center
around a common theme of personal information in relation to external sources while considering
alternative factors that could play a role in the dissemination of information.
In Table 6, the top five keywords are identified for each age group. Collectively from each group
the keywords are: information, personal, private, share, control, and right. For further investigation,
we began to look at the statistical analysis to find the significance of the words for each age subgroup.
In this process we used the analysis of variance (ANOVA) method to analyze the differences between
the groups from our participants. Table 7 explore the statistical values produced from this analysis.
Table 6. Top words used to define privacy using TF-IDF Scores for each document via age demographic.
This table includes the cluster label and the top five words by the highest TF-IDF score.
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Our null hypothesis states that there are no significant differences in age groups in respect to the
keywords. In the age comparison of 18–25 v. 26 & up; we retain the null hypothesis because differences
do not exist in the keywords for age.
Table 7. Calculated ANOVA score for top words used among age groups to define visual privacy.
Age Group Comparison f -Value p-Value
18–25 v. 26+ 0.3275 0.5776
3.3.4. Is Visual Privacy Defined Differently?
From the survey, approximately 6.5% of participants defined visual privacy and general privacy
differently. The keywords listed in Table 8 are similar to the word reference by other groups however,
these definitions combined the words to form a completely different meaning. They focus on the
information gain of companies, lack of control over your privacy, and the risks on those platforms.
This group emphasized how social media and visual privacy creates more risks for the users. The
prevalence of visual content and the growth of social media begins to open more doors for attacks and
dangers.







3.4. Attack Vectors and Existing Dangers
From this survey we investigated what users perceived to be privacy leaks and the dangers of
exposed leaks on social media networks. We asked participants if they would consider certain items
to be privacy leaks. From this question (Table 1J), we see that 97% of participants identify credit or
debits cards, driver’s license, social security numbers, and passports as the highest ranked privacy
leaks. Following close behind are birth certificate (96%), phone numbers (90%), personal letters (85%),
and keys (83%). Participants did not consider images of babies and children to be a privacy leak if
posted on social media by their guardians. Sixty-five percent of participants state that they have seen
these type of privacy leaks on social media networks. From this, participants to identified keywords
or phrases that correlate to those privacy leaks. With this investigation we uncovered hashtags and
words such as #stayoffthesidewalk, #licensedtodrive, and #racisttwitter. Majority of participants stated that
they do not recall the phrase that was used in correlation to the images, but did notice privacy leaks on
their news feed. The words collected from this survey were used for our data collection process in
Section 4.
Next, we ask participants to rank dangers (e.g., burglary, kidnapping, stalking) in reference
to what seems to be most threatening (Table 1K). The top threats are kidnapping, burglary, and
stalking. Table 9 displays the percentage of votes for the threat in each position. Along with the threats,
participants also mentioned cyberbullying, echo chambers, and social isolation (Table 1L).
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Table 9. Threats are listed in their respective order based on survey results. In each ranking column
shows each threat ranking for dangers and their associated vote percentage for that position; the
highest vote for each item is highlighted.
Threat Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5 Rank 6
Kidnapping 52.38% 15.48% 10.71% 3.57% 9.52% 8.33%
Burglary 20.24% 35.71% 17.86% 10.71% 7.14% 8.33%
Stalking 5.95% 14.29% 25.00% 16.67% 23.81% 14.29%
Financial Threat 4.76% 14.29% 23.81% 30.95% 17.86% 8.33%
Identity Theft 14.29% 17.86% 14.29% 25.00% 23.81% 4.76%
Explicit Websites 2.38% 2.38% 8.33% 13.10% 17.86% 55.95%
For further investigation, we began to look at the statistical analysis to find the significance of the
dangers for each subgroup. In this process we used the Analysis of variance (ANOVA) to analyze the
differences between the groups from our participants. Tables 10 and 11 explore the statistical values
produced from this analysis.
Table 10. Statistical analysis of gender related differences of danger assessment results using the
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) method. In the table we see the f -value and p-value for Female and
Male genders.
ANOVA analysis of danger distribution among gender identity
Statistic Value Burglary Kidnapping Explicit Websites Financial Theft Identity Theft Stalking
f -Value 5.2662 2.8248 6.0343 1.8150 4.8928 2.9822
p-Value 0.0063 0.0629 0.0031 0.1668 0.0089 0.0541
To understand the significance of each category, we look at the null hypotheses and p-values
associated with the independent and dependent variables. For each category, we have a null hypothesis
that states if there are no significant differences in gender in the respective category. Our p-value
threshold is set at 0.05. In the categories of burglary, explicit websites, and identity theft; we reject the
null hypothesis because differences exist in gender. For the categories of kidnapping, financial theft,
and stalking; we retain the null hypothesis because no significant differences exist for gender identities.
Within the male and female clusters, the female group displayed a higher concern for the threat of
being posted on an explicit website unlike their male counter parts.
Table 11. Statistical analysis of gender related differences of danger assessment results using the
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) method. In the table we see the f -value and p-value for the age groups:
18–25 & 26 and over.
ANOVA analysis of danger distribution among age groups
Statistic Value Burglary Kidnapping Explicit Websites Financial Theft Identity Theft Stalking
f -Value 0.3491 0.4125 4.1532 3.7922 3.5000 5.2348
p-Value 0.7059 0.6628 0.0178 0.0250 0.0330 0.0064
For each category, we have a null hypothesis that states if there are no significant differences in
age for the respective category. In the categories of explicit websites, financial theft, identity theft, and
stalking; we reject the null hypothesis because differences exist in age. For the categories of burglary
and kidnapping; we retain the null hypothesis because no significant differences exist for age. With
this investigation, we found that the age group above 26 have a higher concern for identity theft. While
their younger counter parts tend to have a higher concern for financial theft, explicit websites, and
stalking.
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The participants allocated privacy leaks into three possible attack vectors (Table 1M). The location
attack vector is used to find out where an individual lives and/or current location. The participants
classified keys, passports, driver’s license, social security cards, and personal letters as an item in
location threat. The identity attack vector is used to exploit an individual’s identity, even to the very
intimate details. The participants classified credit/debit cards, children images, driver’s license, social
security cards, passwords, and personal letters as an item in identity threat. The asset attack vector is
used gain access to an individual’s possessions and valuables. The participants classified credit/debit
card, keys, passports, driver’s license, social security cards, passwords, and personal letters as an item
in asset threat.
4. Data Collection via Web Crawling
To understand the pervasiveness of privacy leaks on SMNs, we ingested tweets from the Twitter
API using the participant described key words. Each key term was obtained from survey participants
who completed our surveys. In our initial survey we ask users to define categories of privacy leaks
based on keywords. Next, we examined the keywords that are related to those categories.
We collected tweets and images from Twitter resulting in approximately 1.4 million tweets
collected and 18,751 images. We collected data using notable keywords derived from the survey and
participant’s responses. This data was collected over a two-month time period.
4.1. Tweet Collection
We collected 1.4 million tweets to analyze the hashtags associated with them (Table 12). Twitter
was searched with keywords derived from the privacy leak categories and the words given from
participants. From the survey, the participants gave key words or phrases that are not currently used
on Twitter (i.e., #stayoffthesidewalk). To find a correlation between related images and hashtag, we
began a search of the words. The top hashtags from this search were #racisttwitter, #gameawards, and
#wikileaks. Of the tweets collected, 109,994 tweets contained images.
Table 12. Results of keyword crawling on Twitter.
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From the tweets collected, the most relevant results are from the college search which includes
the key words college acceptance, college bound, and college letter. In this search we collected
trending hashtags in reference to college searches: #neumannscholarship, #nmsubound, and #hu24.
These hashtags are associated with college acceptances, scholarship acceptances and college letters.
4.2. Image Collection
Beyond collecting basic tweets, we searched for images associated with keywords and hashtags in
the collected tweets. With this search we collected 18,751 images. The images collected were classified
into three categories bases on risk: severe, moderate, and no risk. (1) Severe risk content contains images
that have more than one attack vector (Section 3.4). These images include items that provide actual
government issued identification (i.e., social security numbers, driver’s license, etc.), items that can be
used to identify a person and/or used for facial recognition (driver’s license, identification cards), or
items that contain insight to a person’s location and/or place of residence. (2) Moderate risk content
refers to images from the asset or identity attack vectors. This content includes images that feature
items which can be used to identify a person and/or can be used for facial recognition. However, this
content will not provide the user’s location, place of residence, nor feature any of their government
issued identification. (3) No risk content encompasses images that do not include any of the above
items. The images were classified by three individuals and placed into categories based on the average
agreement. Table 13 shows the total number of images in each category and its respective category
after agreement and assignment.
Table 13. Risk Classification from keyword search with Twitter.




In each category, we found several privacy leaks. In Severe, the most prevalent images are car
keys, license plates, and job offers. In Moderate, the most prevalent images are work identification,
school information, promotion letters images. Table 14 shows the distribution of these images among
the categories.
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The prevalence of images has a higher frequency for the terms baby, hospital, medication, and
medical records. Severe risk includes images containing finances and keys unlike Moderate risk which
contained more college and work-related images. When asking users to define privacy and identify
threats, the participants did not identify hospitals, medical records, or medications as significant
concerns. We find that these images trending on Twitter about medical information and hospitals have
a higher chance of occurring in comparison to the other keywords.
5. Discussion
This study indicates similarities between users’ definitions of privacy. We investigated this topic
by creating subgroups using Kmeans and demographic identities to uncover definitions of privacy.
It further demonstrates a correlation between dangers of SMNs and demographic subgroups. The
analysis confirms that age groups have different levels of concern regarding explicit websites, financial
theft, identity theft, and stalking. It also confirms that female and male participants have differences in
the level of concern regarding burglary, explicit websites, and identity theft.
In line with our hypotheses, (1) the privacy perspective of a user can be subjective, and (2) several
threats and dangers are heightened due to the accessibility of social media. We find that users construct
their own meanings of privacy; however, the definitions show significant overlap. The threats on
these platforms are heightened because of the accessibility of social media. From this analysis, we
find that cyberbullying and explicit content rise to the forefront of concerns. The results do not fit
the hypothesis that visual privacy leaks are common on Twitter; however, rare breaches in privacy
may still be devastating. The reliability of the data from Twitter is limited by the keyword search
terms used. As new trends arise and challenges appear, the keyword associations for the appropriate
images change. To obtain accurate results, it would be important to survey recent keyword trends
and challenges thoroughly. From the survey, 65% of participants state that they have seen privacy
leaks on social media networks; however, we were unable to collect a corresponding amount of visual
privacy leaks. In this study, we have collected words regarding trends and challenges in association
with visual content. From this data, we see that the most accurate keyword search was regarding
college bound and college acceptance.
These results build on existing evidence of previous work regarding the dangers of social
media [1,3,21] and the subjectivity of privacy [3,5]. In this paper, we explore the user thoughts
over different aspects of social media privacy and in particular visual privacy leaks. Users have solid
personal notions of privacy, but they do not yet understand how privacy leaks can affect them. As new
technologies arise, application developers must implement mitigation techniques that allow users to
explore the trade-offs between privacy and sharing. This will be increasingly important for non-text
and visual sharing methods across SMNs.
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